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EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY
IN TEXAS
Burke in his Tract on the Popery Laws used the famous
dictum
"There are two, and only two, foundations of law,
equity and utility."
In the Texas constitutional convention of 1845, Thomas J. Rusk,
the President of the Convention, paraphrased Burke's dictum
and a text he had learned from Blackstone, in these words:
"When cases are to be decided, the eternal principles of
right and wrong are to be first considered, and the next
object is to give general satisfaction in the community."'
He was advocating the employment of juries in equity cases.
He urged that juries were better acquainted with the neighbor-
hood and local conditions and circumstances than a chancellor
and were generally as competent in suits in equity as in cases
at law.
"And if twelve men determine against a man he does
not go away abusing the organs of the law; he comes to
the conclusion that he is in the wrong."
The proposed jury "innovation"-for it was an innovation in
American jurisprudence-was not adopted without strong oppo-
sition, led by Chief Justice John Hemphill, who was Chairman
of the Committee on Judiciary. In the course of his address on
the subject, Judge Hemphill said:
"I cannot say that I am very much in favor of either
chancery or the common-law system. I should much have
preferred the civil law to have continued here in force for
years to come. But inasmuch as the chancery system,
together with the common law, has been saddled upon us,
the question is now whether we shall keep up the chancery
system or blend them together. If we intend to keep it
up as it is known to the courts of England, of the United
States, and of many of the states, we should oppose this
'Debates of the Texas Convention, Sess. July 28, 1845, Wm. F. Weeks,
reporter, published by the authority of the convention (Houston, 1846)
p. 274.
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innovation; for I do not know of any alteration which
could be a greater innovation."'2
It will be necessary to recall that Texas declared its indepen-
dence of Mexico on March 2, 1836. The Constitution of the
Republic of Texas, adopted on March 17, 1836, had provide'd
tha:t the Congress of the Republic should, by statute,
"introduce the common law of England, with such modi-
fications as our circumstances, in their judgment, may
require; and in all criminal cases, the common law shall
be the rule of decision."
Until such time as the Congress should act in this regard, the
"laws now in force in Texas" were to remain in force. The
convention of 1836 broke up in disorder because of the shocking
news of the fall of the Alamo and the invasion in force of the
Mexican armies under the dictator, General Santa Anna. The
first three congresses of the young Republic were engrossed
largely with war legislation and political measures. On Jan.
2o, 184o, the Fourth Congress in terms repealed "all the laws
in force in this Republic prior to the first of Sept., 1836," (i. e.,
the Mexican and Spanish law, including their common law,
which is essentially Roman) and enacted that,
"the common law of England (so far as it is not incon-
sistent with the constitution or the acts of Congress now
in force) shall, together with such acts, be the rule of
decision in this Republic."
To the superficial observer, it might seem that in the contest
on this remote frontier, the common law of England had gained
the day over the civil law of Rome by reason of its greater
virility and superior excellence. The colonists who were the
fathers of the Republic of Texas were almost exclusively Anglo-
Saxons, emigrants from the United States. They had come so
recently under Mexican rule that they had neither time, facilities,
nor inclination to become familiar with the Spanish language
and the Spanish jurisprudence. Even the great Hemphill arrived
in Texas as late as 1838 and acquired his knowledge of the
Spanish law after that date. The wide expanse of country
embraced in the Republic was very sparsely settled (the total
IIbid., pp. 271-272.
'Art. IV, sec. 13.
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population. estimated at 20,000), the ox-cart was the usual means
of transportation, Indian raids and Mexican incursions kept all
the men virtually under arms, and the population were put to it
to produce enough frdm the soil to keep alive. The simple fact
is the early Texans neither gave nor could give any discriminat-
ing thought to their system of private law. This question was
overshadowed by the greater public questions of the maintenance
of independence, of annexation to the United States, of public
land grants, and slavery. Besides, after their experience with
Mexican cruelty and treachery, they had a natural suspicion of
everything Mexican. Little wonder then that they abruptly.
rejected a system of law which was contained in a strange lan-
guage and adopted a system with which they were familiar and
the records of which were written in their own tongue. Had
the local conditions been different then, it is possible Texas like
Louisiana, could have been cited by Dr. Hannis Taylor as a
striking corroboration of his thesis that,
"out of this fusion of Roman private and English public
law there is arising throughout the world a new and com-
posite state system, whose outer shell is English constitu-
tional law, including jury trials in criminal cases, and
whose interior code is Roman. private law."'
It is a fact, however, that the Republic of Texas retained much
of "the law as it aforetime was."
Having adopted the English common law as "the rule of deci-
sion," the Congress proceeded immediately by various statutory
enactments to introduce important modifications of the common
law. The Spanish community system of marital property rights
was retained5 ; common-law rules as to succession were replaced
by the civil-law rules"; the laws7 exempting property, including
the homestead, from forced sale were taken from Spanish proto-
types"; the doctrines of the common law as to the estates arising
"Address before the Texas Bar Association, Proceedings (914) P. 178.
'Act, Jan. 2o, i84o.
'Acts, Jan. 28, 1840, and Feb. 5, i84o.
'Acts, Jan. 26, 1839, and Dec. 22, I840.
* Sayles, Early Laws of Texas, Introduction by Judge Willie, p. vi.
Dillon, Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America, p. 36o, writes:
"The Republic of Texas passed the first homestead act in ]836. It was
the gift of the infant Republic of Texas to the world." The act of Jan.
z6, i83o. is the first Texas legislation on the subject of the homestead.
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under a mortgage were entirely disregarded in the act of Feb. 5,
i84o, providing for the foreclosure of mortgages on real and per-
sonal property to satisfy "the lien created by the making of the
mortgage"; the common-law rules as to the assignment of choses
in action were abolished, as were also livery of seisin and com-
mon-law formalities in conveyancing. 9 The act of Jan. 28, 1840,
on wills retained the legitime and other features of the civil
law; and most sweeping of all, the act of Feb. 5, I84O, expressly
discarded the entire common-law system of pleading and
provided,
"that the proceedings in all civil suits shall, as heretofore,
be conducted by petition and answer."'1
In the interval between the enactment of the last mentioned
act and the constitutional convention of 1845, and in the face
of the rejection of the common-law system of pleading, various
statutes were enacted which referred in terms to the twofold
jurisdiction of law and chancery. The very act of Feb. 5, i84o,
which preserved the former simple system of "petition and
answer"--a system to which the artificial distinction between
actions at law and in equity was wholly foreign-contains a clause
providing that,
"in every civil suit in which sufficient matter of substance
may appear upon the petition to enable the court to
proceed upon the merits of the cause, the suit shall
not abate for want of form; the court shall in the first
instance endeavor to try each cause by the rules and
principles of law; should the cause more properly belong
to equity jurisdiction, the court shall, without delay, pro-
ceed to try the same according to the principles of equity."
This is a general exemption statute. The distinctive provision that the
homestead owned by a married man could not be alienated by him without
the consent of his 'vife first appeared in the constitution of 1845 by vote
of the convention taken Aug. 5, 1845. It was debated in the convention
as a matter of first impression.
'Act, Jan. 25, 184o.
"Later acts imported other elements of the civil law into the juris-
prudence of Texas. We mention here as an example the act of Jan. i6,
x85o, on the institution of a stranger as heir by adoption. Cf. Eckford
et ux v. Know (1886) 67 Tex. 200, 204. It is not within the scope of
this article to indicate all the numerous changes in the common law made
by constitutional or statutory enactment, such as the abolition of dower,
curtesy, primogeniture, estates tail, outlawry, trial by wager of battle,
and wager of law, modifications as to the law of libel, etc.
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It was of this passage that the supreme court of the Republic
said:
"A hundred judges, in almost any conceivable case,
might differ in some degree as to its interpretation and
exact function.""
They suggested that the district judge try each cause as at law,
and "if he cannot succeed in the effort, then ascend the woolsack
and chancel it." Other later statutes of the Republic recognized
the distinction between actions at law and in equity and added
to the perplexity of the-courts in their efforts to harmonize the
civil and the common-law systems.
12
This state of confusion called for fundamental treatment and
the constitutional convention of 1845 supplied it. Upon the
initiative of Hemphill and Rusk, the following provisions were
written into the Constitution of Texas
8 :
"The District Court shall have original jurisdic-
tion . . . . of all suits, complaints and pleas whatever,
without regard to any distinction between law and equity,
when the matter in controversy shall be valued at, or
amount to, one hundred dollars exclusive of interest; and
the said courts, or the judges thereof, shall have power to
issue all writs necessary to enforce their own jurisdiction
and give them a general superintendence and control over
inferior jurisdictions.""
Whiting v. Turley (1842) Dallam (Tex.) 453.
'The act of Feb. 5, i84o, to regulate proceedings in civil suits: sec. 2,
as to costs "in any cause whether at law or equity."
The act of Feb. 5, i84o, on admission to the bar: sec. 2, admittance
"to practice law in all the courts of law and equity."
The act of Jan. 25, 184i, to empower the judges of the district courts
to submit issues of fact to a jury "in chancery cases," sec. 7.
The act of Feb. 5, 1841, on limitations: sec. 9, to the effect that "no bill
of review shall be granted to any decree pronounced in equity after two
years."
The act of Feb. 5, 1841, on sales by "courts of chancery."
These instances bear out Rusk's statement made in the convention of
1845: "Now, sir, the legislature has brought all things into confusion.
Immediately after the revolution it was determined that one court should
have jurisdiction over all cases, rejecting the useless distinction between
law and equity, which has since grown up." Debates, p. 274.
" Art. IV, sec. IO.
"'The proposal to create "separate chancery courts" was voted down
in the convention. Journal of the Convention, p. x91.
As to whether Texas or New York is entitled to the credit of being
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Despite this clear-cut abolition of a dual jurisdiction emigrant
legislators and judges, steeped in the notions of their early legal
training in common-law states and unfamiliar with the civil law,
continued, as in the period from I84O to 1845, to introduce into
the jurisprudence of Texas occasional fragments of the common-
law system.'5 This tendency disappeared as the indigenous sys-
teni evolved and bench and bar became better acquainted withit. Apart from the special statutory action of trespass to try
title for the recovery of land, it is recognized that there is in
Texas but one form of civil action for the enforcement of
private rights of whatever nature.
To abolish the common-law forms of action (including the
chancery system) and yet retain the common law of England
as "the rule of decision" is like trying to remove the motor
nerves from a living being and leave the sensory nerves intact.
The operation has not been successful in Texas.
Mr. Pomeroy asserts that the adoption of the system of code
pleading,
"has not produced, and was not intended to produce, any
alteration of, nor direct effect upon, the primary rights,duties and liabilities of persons, created by either depart-
ment of the municipal law. . . . The codes do not
assume to abolish the distinctions between 'law' and
'equity' regarded as two complementary departments of
the municipal law."1 6
The remark is not applicable to Texas. Texas has never been
a "code state" nor a "quasi-code state."1 7 Its system of plead-
ing arose out of the civil law as truly as did that of Louisiana.18
the first state in the Union to adopt the blended system, see the Report
of the Texas Bar Association Committee reproduced in (z896) 30 Am. IREv. 813. Mr. Sayles' remark (ibid., p. 825) is suggestive: "As Texas
never was a common-law state it cannot be said that she was the firstto abolish the common-law system of practice, but it is the very highest
evidence of the hard common sense of the pioneers of Texas that they
retained these admirable features of the civil law."
'Cf. Blumberg v. -Maxer (1873) 37 Tex. 2; Grassmeyer v. Beeson(1857) I8 Tex. 753, 766; New York & Texas Land Company v. Hyland(1894) 28 S. W. (Tex.) 2D6, 2r4.
"Code Remedies (4th ed.) sec. 8.
"' So classified by Mr. Hepburn in his valuable article, The HistoricalDevelopment 6f Code Pleading in America and England in Select Essays
in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. II, p. 672.
'John C. Townes, Pleading in the District and County Courts of Texas(2d ed.) pp. 84, 85.
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Moreover the constitutional abolition of the distinction between
law and equity in the administration of justice in the Texas
courts is not limited in terms or by right interpretation to the
mere abolition of the distinction between legal and equitable
procedure.1 9  Unfortunately, the opinions of the appellate courts
still abound in loose references to "legal" titles and "equitable"
titles (though the latter are said to be as "potent" as the for-
mer) ; the statutory action of trespass to try title is declared
"essentially a legal action"; the plea of limitation under the
statute is denominated a "legal defense," and so on. Over
against these we get an occasional trenchant pronouncement like
Hemphill's in Bennett v. SpWars: 0
"If the rules and principles arising from the antago-
nisms of the common law and equitable jurisdictions were
thoroughly extirpated from the mind the provisions of
legislation and the decisions and practice of the courts
would become more harmonious and more in accordance
with our system of judicial procedure."
The English common-law system has been further mutilated in
Texas by many statutory enactments and by the adoption of
important fractions of a rival system so that its inner harmony is
destroyed. Moreover, the Texas courts have not hesitated to
declare the rules of the common law inapplicable to our conditions
and inconsistent with our usages. 21 Doubts have also recently
arisen as to what is meant by the expression "the common law of
England" in the Act of I84O quoted above. In The Indorse-
ent Cases,22 decided in reconstruction days by a supreme court
appointed by Major-General Griffin and commanding little respect
in Texas, it was held that the law merchant constituted no part
of the law of Texas because it was no part of the common law,.
i. e., the "ante-statute law of England." The Court of Criminal
Appeals-the court of last resort in all criminal cases-by a vote
'Hamilton v. Avery (1857) 2o Tex. 612: "A subsisting equity, by the
laws of this state that recognize no distinction between law and equity
either in rights or their judicial preservation, confers a right of property
by as strong a sanction as that which exists by a right purely legal"
" (1852) 7 Tex 6oo; 602.
'Stroud v. Springfield (x866) 28 Tex. 649, 666; Pace v. Potter (1893)
85 Tex. 473; Robertson v. State of Texas (igui) 63 Ct Cr. App.
(Tex.) 216. Clarendon Land Co. v. McClelland Bros. (x893) 86 Tex.
179, 085.
n (z869) 31 Tex. 693.
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of two to one held in 1911 that Texas has adopted also the
English statutes in aid or amendment of the common law, passed
before the emigration of our ancestors.2 3  In 1913, the Supreme
Court of Texas in holding that cohabitation was necessary to
constitute a common-law marriage announced that,
"the common law of England adopted by the Congress
of the Republic (of Texas) was that which was declared
by the courts of the different states of the United
States..... .The decisions of the courts of those states
determine what rule of the common law of England apply
to this case. The effect of the act of 184o was not to
introduce and put into effect the body of the common law,
but to make effective the provisions of the common law
so far as they are not inconsistent with the conditions
and circumstances of our people."24
Thus, the English decisions are not controlling as to the common
law in Texas. The doctrine of stare decisis receives a body blow.
A maze of sources is now to be drawn upon. The common
law is not uniform throughout the states. Some have adopted
the "ancient common law"; others the common law with refer-
ence to specific dates, with or without the statutes passed in
amendment thereof; others, like Texas, without reference to
any date.25 None have retained it without important modifica-
tions.
The upshot of the whole matter is that our complex juris-
prudence in Texas has become a storehouse of authorities for any
rule the courts deem suited to our peculiar conditions and to the
exigencies of any particular case, so as to assure to the litigants
substantial justice. The simplicity and flexibility of the Texas
system of pleading, and the variety and complexity-not to say
confusion-in the sources of our rules of substantive law have
had the effect of freeing the Texas courts largely from the
restraints of outworn distinctions and rigid classifications and
reasonings of the remote past and lifting them into the clearer
atmosphere of a living law which is more nearly the reflection
of the economic and social ideals of our time. The jurispru-
dence of Texas to-day is essentially a system of Freirecht. Vari-
ous factors have operated to make it such. It is a fatal mistake
'Robertson v. State of Texas, supra.
" Grigsby v. Reib et al. (i9x3) 105 Tex. 597.
'Cf. (1916) 16 Cot.. L. REv. 499, note.
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to assume that one can get a correct or comprehensive view
of the jurisprudence of a state from the opinions of appellate
courts alone.
28
Early Texas precedents were made under conditions that
gave limited opportunity for the examination of even secondary
authorities and called for large creative freedom in the courts.
2
Apart from Spanish authorities, Kent and Story, the decisions
of the Louisiana courts were most frequently cited. The
Louisiana civil code was admired and was freely drawn upon
in the enactment of early laws. Its article 21 certainly reflected
the viewpoint of the early Texas decisions:
"In civil matters, where there is no express law, the
Judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity.
To decide equitably an appeal is to be made to natural
law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is
silent."
We frequently find such expressions as these:
"The moral sense of what is enjoined by equity and good
conscience must be exceedingly obtuse to suppose that
such flagrant injustice would receive the slightest counte-
nance from any judicatory however organized.' 2
And:
"It appears, then, that the liability of the defendant
must result from the facts of the case, and not from the
avermeffts of the petition. If the possession of the defend-
ant be wrongful, in the popular acceptation of the term,
if it be inequitable and unconscientious . . .. he should
in all events be responsible for the value of the property."
2 9
I think we may safely say that apart from occasional lapses
Quite recently the writer had the privilege of attending a banquet
given in honor of a young lawyer who had just been appointed to the
district court bench. Three members of the appellate courts in their
addresses urgently advised the young jurist to pay little attention to the
refinements of the law, to decide the causes submitted to him upon the
broad basis of conscience and his conception of right and wrong, and
they assured him he would be seldom reversed.
On Dec. i8, 1837, Messrs. Jack and Kaufman were appointed by the
Texas Congress to draft a code of laws, but the Republic had no law
books and they made no progress. On Jan. 23, 1839, $1,ooo.oo was appro-
priated for books for these commissioners. Whether they got the books
or not is not known. They failed to submit a code.
"Hunt v. Turner (1853) 9 TeX- 385.
'Porter v. Miller (1852) 7 Tex. 468, 479, opinion by Hemphill.
YALE. LAW JOURNAL
toward formalism, we have had in Texas from the very begin-
ning a jurisprudence founded upon a "natural law with a
variable content."
Besides the variety and richness of the sources of our juris-
prudence, and the direction given by early precedents, the per-
sonnel of the judiciary has had much to do with the freedom
of our jurisprudence from scholastic subtleties and slavish ven-
eration for the ancient landmarks of the law. We certainly can-
not complain of any Wetjfremdheit on the part of our judges.
All judicial offices in Texas have generally been elective and for
comparatively short terms. 0 - During the Republic the supreme
court was composed of a chief justice, elected by the joint vote
of both houses of Congress, and the several district judges as
associate members. The judges of the Texas appellate courts
have been drawn chiefly directly from the bar, at which they
had achieved such success as brought them into prominence.
Taken thus from the body of the people and dependent upon the
suffrage of the people for re-election, it is unreasonable to sup-
pose -that the judges would consciously seek to bring about any
estrangement between the people and the law. Furthermore,
the overwhelming majority of the Texas judges, trial and appel-
late, have lacked and do lack a systematic law school education.
Of the present membership of the two highest courts in Texas,
not a single man has even attended a law school. After a
painstaking search through available published and unpublished
biographies, I find that only five of the sixty-six members of'
the Supreme Court of Texas graduated from a law school of
any sort. Court opinions aside, not one has ever published a
work of constructive legal scholarship. This is, of course, no
reflection on their native ability nor necessarily on their learn-
ing. But it will not be held unbecoming in me, I am sure, to
say that as a rule the opinions of the appellate courts in Texas
do not disclose such an acquaintance with legal Aistory, legal
philosophy, and the science of jurisprudence, or such a degree
of "discrimination in the use of the expository authorities""'
as one should expect from schooled jurists. It is vital that only
'°The only exceptions occurred in the brief intervals z845-x85o and
i873-x876 when members of the supreme court were to be appointed by
the Governor.
' Cf. Dean Wigmore's trenchant criticisms in The Qualities of Current
Judicial Decisions (x915) 9 ImL. L. REv. 529.
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men of profound knowledge in legal science should be chosen
to administer justice in a system characterized by such elasticity
and freedom as ours. The appellate courts of Texas are now
turning out about i,8oo published opinions a year-no other state
has such an output. We have had-and are still having-a
rough, blundering, frontier sort of justice. There has been much
talk the past two years of "law reform" in Texas, which means
more new and poorly considered legislation. But the heart of
our jurisprudence is sound. If the time ever comes when the
voices of our law professors will be effectively heard and
respected in the forums of justice and the halls of legislation
in this country, we may have a more constructive part in pre-
serving the true principles of the law and keeping its evolution
in right lines. Meantime, in harmony with or in defiance to
"authority," we have the inspiring task of shaping the pro-
fessional ideals and standards of the next generation of lawyers.
G E RGE C. BuTTE.
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